This paper investigates the lending practices related to leverage buyouts (LBOs) market between high and low write-down institutions. The write-downs, which are a proxy for business We contribute to extant literature in the area of financial crisis by providing empirical evidence that both business aggression of some institutions and the increase demand for institutional loans drive the peculiar lending practice during the easy credit period, which subsequently leads to declines in values of assets associated with these loans. Our focus on the role of PE reputation in mitigating aggressive lending practice complements recent studies in the 1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1362421 area of LBO loans market and PE reputation, such as Demiroglu and James (2008) and Ivashina and Kovner (2008). The findings of demand pressure (credit supply) from institutional loans add to the analyses of Ivashina and Sun (2008) and Wang (2008). We provide additional evidence that such increase in institutional loans demand is filled by some aggressive financial institutions, which ex post incur high write-downs during the credit crisis. Many such institutions pay horrendous prices for their business aggression and have ceased to exist in the market.
Introduction
Easy credit and business aggression in financial institutions in recent years not only fuel the problem in subprime mortgage market but also in other areas, such as leveraged buyout market.
According to the U.S. loan market review by Loan Pricing Corporation, syndicated loan issuance dropped to just under $230 billion in the second quarter in 2008. For the same period in 2007, the total issuing amount was almost $582 billion. Loans purchases by institutional investors, such as collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and loans funding leveraged buyouts experienced the greatest decline. The average secondary prices for leveraged loans were at a discount of 88 cents on the dollar.
1 Although the recent credit crunch has created ripple effects on many parts of the economy, research on the sources of the current crisis are just started to accumulate.
In this paper, we investigate whether business aggression of some institutions and the demands from institutional loan investors contributed to recent credit crisis. We utilize the writedowns of major financial institutions from the beginning of 2007 to August 10, 2008 as a proxy for business aggression. These write-downs are mainly due to losses from declining values of securities related to various types of home loans, commercial mortgages, and leveraged loans. dispensing with the usual covenants meant to secure such credits in a development that led to the so-called "cov-light loan"." Such a practice raises concern that financial institutions are too optimistic and lend recklessly because covenants can increase lenders' incentive to monitor borrowers (Rajan and Winton, 1995) . They are also important tools to control conflicts between stockholders and debt holders (Smith and Warner, 1979) . This paper approaches the cov-light question by comparing lending practices among financial institutions. If the cov-light loans are justified economically and are sensible business strategy, then we should not observe systematic relation between institution types and the levels of covenants in loan contracts. We hypothesize that loans originated by institutions with reckless business aggression (high write-downs) contain fewer covenants than those by institutions with low write-downs. Besides covenants, we also compare market share changes and contrast the levels of interest spread between high versus low write-down institutions. The business aggression hypothesis predicts that high write-down institutions aggressively arrange loans for lower quality borrowers, which results in an increase in market share of LBO related loans, decreases in covenants, and increase in interest spread.
The second factor we examine is the demand for institutional loans, which are term loans B, C, D, sold to CLOs vehicle, hedge fund, insurance companies, and other institutional investors.
Securitizations and loan sales permit a much bigger pool of non-bank investors to add loan investment in their portfolios. The easy credit period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) ) pushes many investors searching for "relatively" higher yield products. 4 Such a demand may coerce some aggressive financial institutions with less stringent lending control to originated loans from lower quality 4 The Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect report by Bavaria and Lai (2007) states the following "Covenant-lite loans represent a further example of investors' continuing willingness to take on greater risk in pursuit of yield." Nandy and Shao (2007) also show that institutional loan investors tend to lend to riskier borrowers or riskier loan purpose, such as LBO and takeover.
borrowers. Therefore, we test the institutional demand hypothesis that the aggressive lending practice is more pronounced in the institutional loans segment versus the traditional loans segment.
The third dimension that we analyze is the role of private equity investors during the easy credit period. These investors are also important players in the leveraged buyout market. They provide equity investments in many of the deals. Besides concerning the outcomes of current investments, many private equity investors have build precious reputations to be in the market in the long-run. Demiroglu and James (2008) find that reputable private equity investors pay narrower bank loan spreads and have fewer and less restrictive financial loan covenants. They conclude that the reputation of private equity investors mitigates the agency costs of debt and thus lowers the need for bank monitoring and control. Different from their study, our paper focuses on whether the reputation concerns of private equity (PE) investors can mitigate the business aggression of some institutions and reduce the deterioration of borrower quality -the PE reputational concern hypothesis. We find that during the period of 2001-2006, high write-down institutions drastically increase their market shares in the LBOs related lending. The increase is mainly driven by the increase in institutional loans. Prior to the easy credit period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , high write-down institutions indeed originate loans with more covenants than low write-down institutions in both institutional and non-institutional loan segments. During the easy credit period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , the same pattern persists in the non-institution loan segment. However, in the institutional loan segment, high write-down institutions arranged loans with significantly fewer covenants, but higher interest spread. Demiroglu and James (2007) find that borrowers choose restricted loan covenants to exchange for lower interest cost and to credibly convey their credit quality because for such firms they anticipate smaller probability of violating the covenants. Their findings suggest that high write-down institutions lend to borrower with worse credit quality than low write-down institutions. These results are consistent with the business aggression and institutional demand hypotheses that both factors contributed the peculiar lending practice during the easy credit period.
The findings on the PE reputation, in general, are consistent with prior studies and point to higher reputable PE investors are associated with lower covenants and lower interest spread, but they tend to be statistically insignificant. However, we find very robust results in the segment of institutional loans that are consistent with our PE reputational concern hypothesis during the easy credit period. We find that PE reputation and the number of covenants is negatively related for institutional loans arranged by low write-down institution have fewer covenants but such a reputation-covenant relation is reversed for the loans arranged by high write-down institutions.
Besides PE reputation is significantly negatively related to interest spread for the institutional loans arranged by high write-down institutions. Given that, during the later period, high writedown institutions arranged institutional loans with significantly fewer covenants than low writedown institutions, the positive relation between PE reputation and the number of covenants suggests that more reputable PE can mitigate the aggressive lending practice of high write-down institutions.
We contribute to extant literature in the area of financial crisis by providing empirical evidence that both business aggression of some institutions and the increase demand for institutional loans drive the peculiar lending practice during the easy credit period, which subsequently leads to declines in values of assets associated with these loans. Our focus on the role of PE reputation in mitigating aggressive lending practice complements recent studies in the area of LBO loans market and PE reputation, such as Demiroglu and James (2008) and Ivashina and Kovner (2008) . The findings of demand pressure (credit supply) from institutional loans add to the analyses of Ivashina and Sun (2008) and Wang (2008) . We provide additional evidence that such increase in institutional loans demand is filled by some aggressive financial institutions, which ex post incur high write-downs during the credit crisis. Many such institutions pay horrendous prices for their business aggression and have ceased to exist in the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes recent developments in the credit market and crisis, related studies in the leveraged buyout market, and our hypotheses.
Section 3 describes data selection and variable definitions. Section 4 discusses empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
Credit crisis, Leveraged buyout market, and hypothesis

Credit crisis and institution write-down as a proxy for lending aggression
Over the past decade, "subprime" lending permeated financial markets, not just mortgages.
Since Michael Milken popularized junk bonds, investors have found varying degrees of appetite for lower credit quality investments. It is difficult, however, to discern the unmanifested risk in such speculative financing during an expansionary cycle. Today's vicious circle of illiquidityexcess supply and reduced financing capabilities leading to increased default risk leading to lower demand returning to reduced funding sources -therefore leaves ample opportunity to identify subprime lending and speculative-grade names from others and identify characteristics that led to the bubble.
Difficulties facing corporate loans --and by extension collateralized loan obligations CLOs)
-are well-known. These difficulties include the increasing corporate default rates and decreasing recovery rates; the all-too-frequent downgrades of originally BB and B-rated assets to CCC levels, and their impact on CLO coverage test ratios; the challenges for CLO managers trying to build par coverage amid the "deep discount" purchase haircuts imposed by deal indentures; CLO event of default risks, and many more.
The preceding, "default-benign" credit cycle (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , displaying high levels of liquidity and strong demand, created the opportunity for corporations to borrow heavily, obtaining low coupons despite being supported by weak covenant packages. The performance of these borrowings -be they corporate bonds or bank loans -is, therefore, a crucial to the economy in general, and for CLOs in particular. While the performance of loans and bonds is crucial to the performance of CLOs, so too may the performance of CLOs be crucial to the performance of loans and bonds: CLOs are the largest investor in, and hence source of demand for, sub-investment-grade institutional loans. As such, any continuation (or revival) of the CLO market would bring with it the dual benefits of encouraging the syndication of loans -providing an additional, positive, financing alternative for companies -and increasing demand, which drives loan prices up, ceteris paribus. Even for structurally similar instruments issued by the same company, differences in their related covenants and clauses may distinguish their market prices, assumed default probabilities and expected recoveries upon default. Essentially, the more numerous the restrictions imposed, the earlier a company is likely to trigger one during tough times; the earlier a covenant is triggered, from a lender's perspective, the more likely that some substance remains in the troubled company to effectuate a meaningful recovery. For covenant light loans, the absence of certain covenants would decrease the probability of defaulting on the loan but, if and when it may default, may substantially lower its expected recovery.
From a lender's perspective, the leveraged loan market offered enticing opportunities, not entirely dissimilar from venture capital and private equity: the loans were historically supported by restrictive financial and operating covenants -which allowed lenders significant control over the borrower's activities -and a (typically first) priority interest in the assets with which the borrower secured the loans. Together, the covenants and the priority interest increased the likelihood of high, if not full, recovery upon the borrower's default. Covenants, more particularly encourage the borrowing company to manage across its capital structure, serving both its creditors and shareholders. This is achieved by allowing creditors to monitor the company's performance against certain restrictions, and potentially secure more favorable terms if the company's financial condition deteriorates from where it was when credit was extended.
While the potential effects of covenants are difficult to measure, ex ante, their manifestation, ex post, is therefore evident in higher loss rates. Hence, we use higher loss rates as a first proxy for lending aggression, particularly through covenant light loans.
Leveraged buyout market and private equity investment
In LBOs, buyout sponsors typically buy up all the publicly traded stock of target companies or majority equity ownership of private held companies. These transactions are done partially with borrowed money, e.g., junk bonds or syndicated bank loans. The leveraged buyout industry has grown dramatically since the 1980s. The first boom of leveraged buyouts was to some extent aided by rising stock prices and the rapid development of the junk bond market in the late 1980s.
KKR'S $25 billion hostile takeover of RJR Nabisco marked the peak of the first LBO boom. Ivashina and Kovner (2008) find that bank relationship of private equity firms helps to lower LBO loan spread. Different from all the previous studies, our paper examines the impact of the shift in risk preference of lending institutions as an explanation for excessive LBO loans and loose contracting of loan covenants and links this lending practices to the credit crisis.
Hypotheses
According to the report by Bavaria and Lai (2007) , Standard & Poor's defines "covenantlite" loans as those without maintenance financial covenants, such as minimum fixed-charge coverage and total debt limitations, but with incurrence covenants. Unlike maintenance covenants, which have to be maintained throughout the life of the loan, the restrictions set by incurrence covenants do not have to be met on an ongoing basis unless the borrowers take one of the specific actions that invoke a covenant. Therefore, borrowers' financial condition can deteriorate well beyond the level that lenders would have applied some remedies and miss the opportunity to increase the recovery from troubled borrowers. Chava and Roberts (2008) show that covenants, which allow state-contingent allocation of control rights, can reduce investment distortions.
If lenders anticipate the negative implication of covenant-lite loans, they should demand higher interest spread. Demiroglu and James (2007) find that borrowers choose restricted loan covenants to exchange for lower interest cost and to credibly convey their credit quality because for such firms they anticipate smaller probability of violating the covenants. Their findings suggest that light covenants coupled with high interest rate imply lower quality borrowers. Fees are lucrative from this type of borrowers. A new leveraged loan can carry an arranger fee of up to 2.5% of the total loan commitment (Miller, 2006) . If some institutions with aggressive business culture chose to pursue such high fees that are not economically justified, then this business aggression can lead these financial institutions astray and to incur high write-downs during credit crisis. In this case, we would observe that high write-down institutions arranged more loans with fewer covenants protection and higher interest spread than low write-down institutions -the business aggression hypothesis.
The developments in the loan market have changed lender constituencies. There are two major types of syndicated lenders: banks and institutional investors. Banks and finance companies tend to lend at a pro rata basis in the so-call "pro rata" tranches, which include revolving credit and term loan A. All types of lenders may buy institutional tranches but these loans are structured specifically for institutional investors. Institutional loans include term loan B, C or D because they are lined up behind term loan A. By 2006, many loans only constitute revolving credit and institutional term loans (Miller, 2006) . During the easy credit period, one challenge for asset managers is to increase the return of their investments because of historically low interest rates. The search and demand for high yield products may play a role in coercing some institutions to engage in reckless lending and to bring in lower quality borrowers. If such an institutional demand is an important factor contributes to the recent credit crisis, then we should observed that high write-down institutions arranged more institutional loans and such loans arranged by high write-down institutions have fewer covenants and higher interest spreads than those by low write-down institutions. We test these predictions as the institutional demand hypothesis. 
Sample selection and variable definition
Sample selection and distribution
We use the deal synopsis in Securities Data Corporations (SDC) to classify the buyout as private equity sponsored leveraged buyout (LBO). SDC uses a classification that is based on the type of investor that leads the deal and not on the amount of equity participation by each investor type. We also include management buyout (MBO) when investor leading the deal is management group. We identify loans lend to companies during the year or within five years of the above private equity investments. We did not exclude loans with the deal purpose other than LBO and
Takeover because firms with PE investments may also borrow for other purposes, such as For each institution, high write down institutions are those if the % of write down scaled by loan amount is above median.
To make the loan type as homogeneous as possible, we only use term loans in our analysis.
After removing facilities with missing values, the final sample consists of 1073 loans. Figure one shows the frequency distribution of sample by year and by institution write-down type. Low write-down institutions appear to reduce the number of loans during the post-bubble period. On the contrary, high write-down institutions increase such transactions over time. Because some loans deals can be lead-arranged by both high and low write-down institutions, we classify such deals as mix type. Loans arranged by mix type institutions also appear to increase during the second half of the sample period. The same information is reported in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that high write-down institutions originate loans more aggressively than low write down institutions during the post-internet bubble period when the credit market was loose. Bank, are low write-down institutions. All three reduce lending activities dramatically. The combined market share decreases from 65% to 37%. On the contrary, 14 out of 15 high writedown institution increase loan market share during the same period.
Variable definitions and summary statistics
The key loan characteristic in our analysis is covenants. 6 It is difficult to analyze individual covenants in great details because different loans can have different types or sets of covenants.
Therefore, we follow Bradley and Roberts (2004) by using a covenant index. Specifically, covenant index is defined as the sum of six covenant indicators, which are collateral, dividend restriction, more than two financial covenants, asset sales sweep, equity issuance sweep, and debt issuance sweep. This measure is very suitable for our analysis because we would like to examine whether aggressive institutions tend to lend the so-called cov-light loans. Table 4 reports average covenants by institution type and by sub-period. In both periods, mix institutions have the higher value of covenant index than the other two types -high and low, but there is no difference between high and low institutions regardless of time period.
During the first half of sample period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , there is no significant difference between low and high write-down institutions in all variables listed in (2008) find that LBO deals with more than one private equity investor pay lower prices to targets, so we control for the number of private equity investors in our analysis. There is a high positive correlation between the various reputation measures of a private equity firm, suggest that they are reasonable proxy for the private equity firm's reputation. Table 4 reports the age of private equity investors that have invested in borrowers. There are no statistically significant differences among different types of institutions in terms of private equity firms' reputation.
Empirical results
Our paper complements Demoriglu and James (2008), which focuses on how private equity firm's reputation affects the contract terms of loans and Ivashina and Kovner (2008), which analyzes bank relationship of private equity firms. Unlike these two papers, our focus is on whether the changes in lending practices during post bubble period is due to aggressive business 7 We also construct alternative measure of reputation such as total capital under-management or investment record of a private equity firm. Investment record is the total dollar amount of all SDC-recorded public-to-private and private-to-private buyout transactions that a private equity firm invested in during the prior three years. However, both measures are missing for many observations and they tend to be available for more reputable private equity investors, so we use vintage age of private equity firms as reputation proxy.
strategies in some institutions and the drivers of such a development. We utilize the recent writedowns of major institutions related to leverage buyout loans and mortgage back securities as a proxy for business aggression. So we compare the lending practices between high and low writedown institutions. We hypothesize that high write-down institutions are those bringing lower quality borrowers to the market by using cov-light loans and charging higher interest rates. If such lending practice is economically justified, then institutions engage in such a practice would not have incurred substantial higher write-downs ex post. Besides analyzing who originated covlight loans, we also investigate whether the recent development in institutional loans is one of the drivers of such aggressive lending.
Because the sample constitutes most of private firms, so we only have three firm characteristics for analysis. They are sales at loan close, company age, and industry. Table 5 reports the determinants of covenant index by sub-period and by institutional loan. We find that, compared to low write-down institutions, high write-down institutions originated significantly fewer covenants only in the institutional loan segment during the post bubble period. The estimates on private equity firm's reputation also show different pattern from those for other subsamples. Higher private equity firm reputation is associated with fewer covenants for loans originated by low write-down institutions. However, the significantly positive estimate on interaction between private equity firm reputation and high write-down institutions indicates that the level of covenants in loans originated by high write-down institutions is positively related to private equity firm's reputation. Demiroglu and James (2007) find that borrowers choose restricted loan covenants to exchange for lower interest cost and to credibly convey their credit quality because for such firms they anticipate smaller probability of violating the covenants.
Taken together, these findings suggest that high write-down institutions lent with fewer covenants than low write-down institution, which suggests lending to lower quality borrowers.
Reputable private equity investors mitigate such an aggressive lending practice by bringing in relatively higher quality borrowers who self-select to use more covenants to reduce interest costs.
During the first half of our sample period, loans originated by high write-down institutions indeed have significantly more covenants than those by low write-down institutions regardless of loan type. Private equity firm's reputation is positively related to the level of covenants for the loans originated by low write-down institutions in the segment of institutional loans. Institutional loans borrowed by larger companies (sales as the proxy for firm size) also have more covenants.
However, such a relation is not significant in the segment of non-institutional loans regardless of time period. Loans lead-arranged by more than one lender and loans with the stated purpose of LBO and takeover have more covenants. Most of the estimates on control variables, such as the number of private equity investors, borrowing company age, whether the company is in a hightech industry, loan amount, and loan maturity are not significant during the first half of the sample period. During the post-bubble period, larger borrowing firms and firms with more private equity investors have more covenants in the loan contracts. Table 6 reports the regression analysis of interest spread. Consistent with the findings in Table 5 that, during the post-bubble period, high write-down institutions lent to lower quality borrowers in the institutional loan segment, they charge significantly higher interest rates than low write-down institutions. Again, reputable private equity investors appear to mitigate such an aggressive lending practice, borrowing companies with investment by more reputable private equity investors pay lower interest rate in institutional loans originated by high write-down institutions. Such a relation does not exist during other sub-period and in the segment of noninstitutional loans. The estimates of most of the control variables are not significant.
We conduct two robustness tests. Because 14.5% of loans are lead arranged by the mix writedown institutions, we re-examine the regression analysis for institutional loans during the postbubble period without those loans. Table 7 shows that the findings are robust. The second robustness check is to address mergers among major financial institutions. Because the writedown information is only available for the post-merged entities, so it is impossible to classify the pre-merger targets. DealScan updates the lender parent companies and does not keep the old lender parent companies, so we restore the original lender parent companies by using the mergers and acquisitions database from SDC Platinum of Thomson Financial. We remove observations if the original lender parent companies upon loan origination are different from the most recent lender parent companies. The main results reported in Table 8 are robust.
Conclusions
The credit crisis started in 2007 has caused major financial institutions to write down more than $500 billion by mid-August 2008. The wealth destruction in various capital markets has been unprecedented. Crisis of this magnitude does not happen in one night and is not caused by a few factors. However, it is important to investigate critical pieces before we can put the whole picture together. We choose to examine the lending practice related to leveraged buyout market prior to the credit crisis because it has caused major concerns other than the mortgage market.
We find that high write-down institutions engaged in reckless lending during the period of 
